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Organizational ingenuity and the paradox of embedded agency:
The case of the embryonic Ontario solar energy industry

We examine organizational ingenuity within the paradox of embedded agency where
organizational stakeholders are constrained in their behaviors by institutions, yet also influence
and change these institutions. In this study organizational ingenuity represents the agency
component and institutional constraints the embedded component. We build theory about
ingenuity from a four-year case study of the embryonic Ontario solar industry. There were two
major institutional constraints, limited grid access and political uncertainty. These led to four
ingenuity strategies that emerged at different times and levels of analysis that challenged,
complied with, or escaped the constraints. We combine these findings to develop a process
model of the emergence of ingenuity in this embryonic industry. Lastly, we find that extending
legitimacy to an ingenuity strategy is necessary for its success.

Keywords
Ingenuity, institutional theory, institutional constraints, legitimacy, paradox of embedded agency,
solar energy industry
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Introduction
Organizational ingenuity is an emerging construct in management research that encompasses
innovative activity within institutional constraints (Lampel, Honig, & Drori, 2011). As an
emerging construct, it requires both theoretical analysis and qualitative research to refine its
definition, formulate propositions, and examine its empirical applicability (Kaplan, 1964;
Suddaby, 2010a). Since ingenuity takes place within institutional constraints (Lampel et al.,
2011), we draw from institutional theory to orient our research (Suddaby, 2006).
We connect ingenuity to two related puzzles in institutional theory concerning how
stakeholders interact with the institutional environment. One puzzle involves the tension between
top-down and bottom-up processes in the creation, maintenance, and change of institutions
(Scott, 1994, 2008). The second puzzle is the paradox of embedded agency, which considers how
institutional change is possible, given that stakeholders are constrained by the very institutions
they seek to change (Garud, Hardy & Maguire, 2007; Seo & Creed, 2002; Zietsma & Lawrence,
2010). In both puzzles, existing institutional constraints place top-down pressure on stakeholders
to conform, a process known as institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), whereas
stakeholders often seek to change these constraints from the bottom-up. Although organizing to
change institutions is a component of institutional entrepreneurship (DiMaggio, 1988; Dorado,
2005, Perkmann & Spicer, 2007), ingenuity is unique because it also includes entrepreneurial
innovation within structural constraints (Lampel et al., 2011), and these innovations and the
organizations creating them must have legitimacy from the institutional environment (Van de
Ven & Garud, 1989). There has been little empirical attention to how stakeholders in embryonic
industries use bottom-up processes when facing powerful institutional constraints (Van Dijk,
Berends, Jelinek, Roome & Weggeman, 2011; Scott, 2008; Suddaby, 2010b). Accordingly, we
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address the following research question: How does organizational ingenuity play a role in the
paradox of embedded agency within an embryonic industry?
We answer our research question using a longitudinal case study of the embryonic solar
energy industry in Ontario during 2009-12 with data from interviews of 22 industry stakeholders
and 91 media articles. We use these data to identify our three main constructs of interest,
organizational ingenuity, institutional constraints, and legitimacy, and we develop a process
model that tracks their evolution over time.
Our study addresses a number of central topics regarding ingenuity and its linkages to
institutional theory. First, we find that Oliver’s (1991) set of responses to institutional processes
is a useful way to conceptualize types of ingenuity strategies and thus contribute to the construct
clarity and underlying nature of ingenuity (Suddaby, 2010a). In so doing, we show that these
ingenuity strategies are linked to business innovation and entrepreneurial action and occur at
different levels of analysis (Lampel et al., 2011). Second, we identify a condition for the
development of ingenuity (Lampel et al., 2011), specifically when successful innovation
ironically engenders institutional constraints. Third, we examine the dynamics of organizational
ingenuity (Lampel et al., 2011) by showing how ingenuity strategies and their legitimacy evolve
over time. In so doing, we contribute to the understanding of dynamic behavior of entrepreneurs
facing top-down institutional forces (Barley & Tolbert, 1997; Greenwood et al., 2002; Perkmann
& Spicer, 2007; Scott, 2008; Suddaby, 2010b).
We proceed as follows. First, we review the literature on ingenuity and the paradox of
embedded agency; this sets the theoretical context for our case study (Strauss & Corbin 1998;
Suddaby 2006). Second, we discuss our methodology, including our research context, the data,
and the analyses. Third, we present our findings organized around the induced process model of
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ingenuity. Fourth, we discuss the implications for researchers, policy-makers, and managers,
followed by a brief conclusion.

Theoretical Foundations
Ingenuity
There is little research conceptualizing ingenuity. We adopt the definition presented by the
editors for this special issue titled Discovering Creativity in Necessity: Organizational Ingenuity
under Institutional Constraints: Ingenuity is “the ability to create innovative solutions within
structural constraints using limited resources and imaginative problem solving” (Lampel et al.,
2011, p. 458). Ingenuity takes place within institutional constraints, and it involves adapting to
existing constraints, developing new domains of action, and/or changing the constraints (Lampel
et al. 2011). Ingenuity is closely aligned yet different from creativity, innovation and agility. We
define each in turn then differentiate them from ingenuity.
Creativity is defined as “the production of novel and useful ideas in any domain” and
innovation as the “successful implementation of creative ideas within an organization” (Amabile
et al., 1996, p. 1155). What sets innovation apart from creativity is its implementation within
organizations. Creativity can thus be viewed as a first step to innovation. Innovative ideas need
not be new to the world but must perceived as new to the people and can include new products,
processes, markets, supplies, and organizations (Rogers, 1983; Schumpeter, 1986; Van de Ven,
1986). Ingenuity is “the ability to create innovative solutions” and it incorporates not only
producing novel, useful ideas but also implementing them. Therefore, creativity and innovation
are necessary – but not sufficient – parts of ingenuity. The final parts of ingenuity are the
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presence of structural constraints and stakeholders with limited resources innovating within these
constraints.
Agility is defined as “a firm’s ability to cope with rapid relentless and uncertain changes
and thrive in a competitive environment of continually and unpredictably changing
opportunities” (Lu & Ramamurthy, 2011, p. 932). Researchers predominantly in management of
technology (e.g., Sambamurthy, Bharadwaj & Grover, 2003) and strategy (e.g., Goldman, Nagel
& Preiss, 1995; Roth, 1996; Sull, 2010) have been preoccupied with strategic agility because this
concept deals with firm success. Ingenuity bears some resemblance to strategic agility primarily
through its focus on ability. Agility focuses less on particular ideas and more on adapting to a
changing, uncertain, and competitive environment. In contrast, ingenuity focuses more on ideas
implemented in the context of a constraining institutional environment, which may or may not be
changing (Lampel et al. 2011).
The paradox of embedded agency in institutional theory
Institutional theorists have demonstrated how, when constrained by institutional forces,
organizations tend to become similar over time (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Heugens & Lander,
2009; Tolbert & Zucker, 1996). We define institutional constraints as limitations or restrictions
on the behavior of stakeholders (Seo & Creed, 2002; Scott 2008). Initial research focused on
how stakeholders are relatively passive recipients of constraints (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983;
Mezias, 1990). In subsequent research, stakeholders were conceived as actively pursuing
interests and thus had varying responses to institutional pressures (DiMaggio, 1988; Lawrence &
Suddaby, 2006; Oliver, 1991; Perkmann & Spicer, 2007; Scully & Meyerson, 1996; Zietsma &
Lawrence, 2010). Seo and Creed (2002) theorized that potential change agents would mobilize
and exhibit collective action to change institutions.
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These two areas of investigation have been labeled the paradox of embedded agency
where stakeholders are constrained in their behaviors by institutions, yet they also influence and
change institutions (Garud et al., 2007; Seo & Creed, 2002). The paradox of embedded agency is
a theoretical framework that incorporates both top-down and bottom-up institutional
development. Given that ingenuity takes place within institutional constraints (Lampel et al.,
2011), we propose that ingenuity is important to the bottom-up efforts of stakeholders in the
paradox of embedded agency.
Although no research to date has examined the role of ingenuity in the paradox of
embedded agency, research examining institutional entrepreneurship provides some insights.
Institutional entrepreneurship is the examination of industry stakeholders as drivers of
institutional change (DiMaggio 1988; Dorado 2005; Garud, Jain & Kumaraswamy 2002; Rao
1998). As Perkmann and Spicer (2007) point out, research in institutional entrepreneurship has
found that stakeholders can drive change through the formation of collaborations (DiMaggio
1988; Dorado 2005), through the identification of cause and effect relationships (Greenwood et
al., 2002; Strang & Meyer 1993), and the importance of legitimizing change (Creed, Scully &
Austin, 2002; Lounsbury, Ventresca & Hirsch, 2003; Rao 1998).
Not only is legitimizing change important, maintaining legitimacy is also a central
concern for stakeholders who face institutional constraints (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Greenwood
et al., 2002; Suchman, 1995). We define legitimacy as the generalized acceptability of an entity
or practice within a social system (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008; Suchman, 1995). Legitimacy is
important because it enables an entity to obtain necessary resources, reduce uncertainty, and
ultimately enhance survivability (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Drori &
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Honig, 2013; Suchman, 1995). Because ingenuity occurs within institutional constraints, it is
important to consider the legitimacy of ingenious stakeholders and their actions.
We examine four types of legitimacy in our study: pragmatic, moral, cognitive, and
regulative. Suchman (1995) divided legitimacy into three categories: pragmatic, moral and
cognitive. Pragmatic legitimacy addresses the question: what’s in it for me? Its assessment is
based on self-interest. Moral legitimacy addresses the question: what’s in it for society? Its
assessment is based on normative approval and the promotion of social welfare. Cognitive
legitimacy is described as passive acceptance and the absence of questions (Meyer & Scott,
1983; Suchman, 1995). Scott (1994) also divided legitimacy into three categories: regulative,
normative, and cognitive. For our purposes, his conceptualizations of normative and cognitive
types are sufficiently similar to the moral and cognitive dimensions of Suchman (1995). The
addition of regulative legitimacy represents acceptability to the rules and procedures of
authoritative bodies, most commonly the state. As such, regulative legitimacy is indicative of a
top-down institutional constraint.

Method
Qualitative methodology
There is limited research on the subject of organizational ingenuity, and our research question
asks: How does organizational ingenuity play a role in the paradox of embedded agency within
an embryonic industry? Given this, we used a qualitative case study methodology because it is
appropriate when examining “how” and “why” questions in a novel setting that facilitate
building new theory (Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Yin, 2009). Our case is the
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embryonic Ontario solar energy industry, a part of the broader energy industry. We used
interviews and an analysis of media reports to address our research question.
We first describe our research context. We then explain how we collected and analyzed
our interview and media data. We conclude this section by discussing how we developed our
process model of ingenuity strategies emerging over time in response to institutional constraints.
Research context
We examined the embryonic solar energy industry in Ontario from January 2009 to July 2012.
This setting was appropriate for answering our research question because the industry essentially
began in 2009 when the Ontario government passed the Green Energy Act (GEA) and we
observed ingenuity within embedded agency. Our case is consistent with Eisenhardt and
Graebner’s (2007) recommendation to select cases that are particularly suited to investigating
constructs of interest and the relationships among them.
With a population of 17 million people, Ontario is the most populous province in Canada.
The province is plagued with increasing energy demands and limited nonrenewable resources
and, therefore, arguably stands to gain the most from investment in renewable sources of energy.
Consequently, the province proceeded aggressively with an agenda to promote investment in
renewable energy (solar, wind and biomass). In February 2009, the Liberal government of
Ontario passed the GEA that permitted renewable energy to contribute up to seven percent of the
province’s energy needs. The GEA was created to spur investment in renewable energy,
encourage energy conservation, and create jobs. A key component of the GEA is the Feed-inTariff (FIT) program, which is the first comprehensive FIT program in North America (Ontario
Ministry of Energy, 2012). The program allows homeowners, organizations, and private
developers to generate renewable energy and sell it at guaranteed rates for a fixed term to the
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Ontario Power Authority (OPA), a crown corporation responsible for the entire electricity system
of the province. The heart of the solar energy industry is in southwestern Ontario. At latitude
42.2° North, Essex County is the southernmost tip of Canada and receives the most powerful
sunlight in the country. The city of Windsor in Essex County is the leading regional city and
home to many of the solar energy entrepreneurs.
Interviews
We conducted two waves of interviews. The first was in June-July 2011. At this point in time,
the fate of the GEA was an important issue in the fall provincial election, which created
considerable political uncertainty (described below). The second wave of interviews was in JuneJuly 2012, after the Liberal government was re-elected and made some changes to the GEA. This
allowed us to learn more about the evolution of the initial ingenuity strategies and the
development of new ingenuity strategies in response to the few changes in government policy.
Our initial sample of participants was selected based upon our knowledge of the industry
gleaned through media coverage of influential Ontario solar industry stakeholders. From this
sample, we used the snowball technique. We conducted 12 interviews in summer 2011. All 12
participants were asked for a follow-up interview in June 2012. One had left the industry after
his firm went bankrupt; six were not available; and five spoke to us again. We also interviewed
10 more people identified through the snowball technique. Our sample contained participants
from various stakeholder groups and was reflective of the population because it included most of
the main players in the regional solar cluster. Participants were either the highest ranked
individual at the organization or the highest ranked individual within the Canadian operation of a
multinational company. Table 1 provides general, non-identifying information on our
participants, including the organization they worked for, their position within the organization,
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and when they were interviewed. Interviewing various stakeholders with diverse and sometimes
conflicting perspectives reduced the likelihood of convergent sense-making and impression
management and thus gave us a comprehensive understanding of the industry (Eisenhardt &
Graebner, 2007). Furthermore, interviewing diverse stakeholders helped offset biases or lapses
(Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Van Dijk et al., 2011). Lastly, through our media analysis we
ascertained that most of the major players in the regional solar energy industry were interviewed.
-------------------------------------------------Insert Table 1 about here
---------------------------------------------------Our interviews were conducted as follows. We asked semi-structured questions centered
on the nature of the person and the organization he or she worked for, the institutional
constraints, and the responses to these constraints. The interviews ranged from just under one
hour to nearly two hours. All interviews were recorded and transcribed.
Two of the authors and a research assistant subsequently analyzed the interviews using
NVIVO 9. We coded the data according to conceptualizations of institutional constraints and
ingenuity. Our analysis included topic intensity and topic commonality among the participants.
Institutional constraints were coded in terms of political, environmental, social, and
technological categories. These were general barriers faced by the solar industry that were
external and difficult to control. We coded ingenuity as any creative and useful idea that was
innovatively implemented while operating under institutional constraints. Specifically, any new
strategy that had yet to appear in the Ontario solar industry that was developed in response to the
identified institutional constraints was coded as organizational ingenuity. Coding ingenuity in
this way permitted us to examine the successes (i.e., the strategy resulted in either a change to the
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constraints or enabled stakeholders to escape them) and failures (i.e., the strategy neither
changed the constraints nor helped stakeholders escape them). This is in contrast to identifying
ingenuity after constraints had been modified or avoided, which would have limited our analysis
to successful strategies only. Our longitudinal analysis of the Ontario solar industry from its birth
to its current state enabled us to determine if a strategy was novel and innovative. In addition, it
enabled us to determine if the strategy was successful within the time period examined. We
resolved discrepancies through discussion (Margolis & Molinsky, 2008).
Media articles
We conducted a content analysis of all articles about solar energy in The Windsor Star, the
largest daily newspaper in southwestern Ontario. Reading these articles enhanced our
understanding of the industry. Our content analysis allowed us to further examine the evolution
of the institutional constraints, organizational ingenuity, and legitimacy over the study period and
to triangulate with our interview findings. Following Bansal and Clelland (2004), a single source
of media data was used to avoid duplicate news.
In 2009 and 2010, The Windsor Star published only four articles about the solar industry.
However, from January 2011 to July 2012, it published 87 articles, for a total sample of 91. This
demonstrated the rapid and growing importance of the embryonic solar industry. Indeed, the
intensity of media coverage increased dramatically as solar energy became a provincial election
issue. We obtained this sample of articles from the Canadian Newsstand Database provided by
ProQuest using the key word “solar”. Originally we also included the key word “renewable,” but
a large number of irrelevant articles, such as wind energy, accompanied this term.
In a review of the literature on the operationalization of legitimacy, content analysis of
media articles was a common method of measurement (e.g., Barron, 1998; Brown & Deegan,
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1998; Deephouse, 1996; Lamertz & Baum, 1998). Our use of The Windsor Star to measure
legitimacy was bolstered by the fact that it enjoys one of the highest readership penetrations in
Canada – 80 percent (Newspaper Audience Databank, 2012), so that news about the solar energy
industry would reflect and influence the attitudes of area residents (Deephouse, 1996).
The first two authors coded the newspaper articles and any discrepancies were resolved
through discussions. Each article was coded in terms of: 1) whether or not it conferred legitimacy
and how it did so; 2) if and how organizational ingenuity was mentioned; and 3) if and how
institutional constraints were mentioned. Constraints and ingenuity were coded in the same way
as in the interview data. Of the 91 articles, 44 discussed institutional constraints, and 35
discussed organizational ingenuity. Legitimacy was coded for each article (Bansal & Cleland,
2004; Lamertz & Baum, 1998). Any article that discussed the solar industry in a positive or
neutral manner was coded as conferring legitimacy; any article that discussed the solar industry
in a negative manner was coded as questioning the legitimacy of the industry (Deephouse, 1996;
Meyer & Scott, 1983). Of the 91 articles, 65 articles in our media analysis conferred legitimacy,
and 26 did not.
Model development
We used the interview and media data to develop a process model of the development of
ingenuity strategies in the Ontario solar industry. This model included the identification and
conceptualization of top-down institutional forces, bottom-up ingenious responses, and their
emergence over time. In developing this model, we considered the applicability of different
theoretical frameworks regarding the interaction of stakeholders with institutional forces (e.g.,
Oliver, 1991; Perkmann & Spicer, 2007; Scully & Meyerson, 1996; Seo & Creed, 2002). We
also applied research on the development of legitimacy, especially for new industries (e.g.,

13	
  

Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Drori & Honig, 2013; Scott, 1994; Suchman,
1995). Each author developed conceptualizations and process models and sent them for review
by the other authors. We developed an initial model after the first wave of interviews in 2011 and
discussed it with the second round of interviewees in 2012. In our analyses of the data, we found
that Oliver’s (1991) framework of strategic responses to institutional processes helped position
our data in theory (Suddaby, 2006). Consequently, we incorporated some of her terms into our
conceptualizations. We converged after many iterations to the findings we present next.

Findings
Figure 1 presents the induced process model (Langley, 1999; Van de Ven, 2007). It
depicts the relationships between the top-down institutional forces and bottom-up organizational
ingenuity at four different levels of analysis in the Ontario solar energy industry from 20092012. We identified five strategies, one institutional constraint, and one institutional enabler that
turned into an institutional constraint. We present these chronologically.
-------------------------------------------------Insert Figure 1 about here
---------------------------------------------------Industry Emergence: Institutional enabling and entrepreneurial innovation
Institutional enabler: Grid access. The implementation of the GEA allowed renewable
energy to provide up to seven percent of the power to the Ontario electric distribution system,
commonly referred to as “the grid”. This legally sanctioned grid access was a top-down
institutional force that enabled renewable energy to be part of the province’s energy sources,
whereas previously renewables could not exist at a sufficient scale. This legal permission
provided regulatory legitimacy to the solar energy industry that was important for its emergence
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(Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Scott, 1995). Cognitive legitimacy existed in that the ability and desire for
renewable energy to contribute up to seven percent of energy demand was not questioned as
evidenced in the media data (Meyer & Scott, 1983; Suchman, 1995).
Compliance strategy. In response to this institutional change, a variety of entrepreneurs
entered the market between 2009 and 2010 to manufacture and install solar panels. These
entrepreneurs were innovative because they successfully implemented new ideas in new
organizations in new markets (Schumpeter, 1986; Van de Ven, 1986). Some adapted
manufacturing facilities used in the auto industry. We termed this a compliance strategy (Oliver,
1991), in that entrepreneurs accepted the institutional rules and created new firms to take
advantage of the opportunities the rules provided. This was not an ingenuity strategy because
firm resources were not limited and institutional rules were not constraining (Lampel et al.,
2011).
The compliance strategy generated considerable energy and economic impact. Investment
in the renewable energy industry was substantial ($26 billion in private investments from 20092011). Where only a few thousand clean energy jobs existed previously, over 20,000 jobs were
created, 8,000 within solar energy (Ontario Ministry of Energy, 2012). By July 2012,
approximately 2,500 renewable projects were approved, producing enough energy to power 1.2
million homes (Sorensen, 2012). The ten largest solar farms in the country were built in Ontario,
making the province the leading solar energy producer in Canada; the 80 MW Sarnia Solar
project is the largest operational solar photovoltaic farm in the world, generating enough energy
to power approximately 12,000 homes a year (Ontario Ministry of Energy, 2012). The ability to
create jobs and provide electricity from solar panels in Ontario enabled the industry to gain
pragmatic legitimacy by providing jobs and income from electricity generation to buyers of solar
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panels. Pragmatic legitimacy was evident in news about economic issues, such as job creation,
business growth, and new markets (e.g., Hall, 2011a Macaluso, 2011; Pearson, 2011), and
political issues, such as the role of renewable industry in the re-election of the government (Hall,
2011d).
This ability also addressed societal concerns about the environment and employment
(McAllister Opinion Research, 2010). Solar energy was portrayed as a clean and renewable
source of energy providing societal benefits through reduced greenhouse gas emissions and
dependency on fossil fuels. Accordingly, moral legitimacy was evidenced by news about the
environment (clean, renewable energy, for example, Wolfson, 2011a), and society (local
University expertise, solar panels on schools, community centers, religious buildings, houses,
and government and corporate buildings, for example, Hall, 2011c). Another important benefit
was the thousands of jobs already created by the solar industry and the promise of more in the
future. The endorsements of local, public and private organizations that purchased solar panels
also bestowed moral legitimacy as these were viewed as “progressive” organizations which took
the lead in the future of clean energy in Ontario.
The seven percent limit for renewable energy specified in the GEA was reached in less
than a year, however. One reason why this happened so fast was that large, well-financed wind
companies moved in quickly, and the smaller solar firms were left scrambling for the remaining
grid access. With the Ontario government refusing to increase the limit, the seven percent
maximum changed from enabling the industry to constraining it. This resulted in an
environmental jolt for the renewable energy industry (Meyer, 1982). A second institutional
constraint emerged as well, political uncertainty. We address these two constraints that
engendered ingenious responses in the next section.
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Institutional constraints
We identified two main institutional constraints from our data. The first was limited grid access,
the inability of solar producers to connect to the grid. This theme was discussed by all 22
interviewees (100%) and coded 61 times; it appeared in six media articles out of 91 (6.5%). The
second institutional constraint was political uncertainty. This theme was discussed by 16
interviewees (73%) and coded 46 times; it appeared in 38 of the 91 media articles (42%). Both
constraints were evident immediately following the introduction of the GEA in February 2009.
Limited grid access. Interviewees agreed that connecting to the grid was the hot button
issue in the Ontario solar industry. Participants in both waves of interviews were quick to express
their frustrations with the limit, often within the first few minutes of the interview. For example:
“A lot of what’s holding the industry back right now is the connectivity to the grid…that’s really
holding back this kind of massive explosion in Ontario right now.”
A consistent reason given for the lack of grid access was the failure to transition from a
centralized to a decentralized energy system. The existing centralized generation and distribution
functions of the current Ontario electricity industry created barriers to grid access. One
participant noted:
When any country decides to get into renewable energy there is a change in concept from
centralized generation of energy to decentralized; that puts a great strain on the actual
grid resources.
In the case of solar energy, each individual solar panel installation becomes an energy
provider. Thus, the system transitions from centralized with a single energy provider to
decentralized with multiple providers. Not surprisingly, the centralized OPA was hesitant to give
up its monopolistic power. As explained by one participant: “If you’re used to a central power
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system and you are the monopoly holder, then your life is comfortable because you have perfect
control, you’re the only entity.”
A second and related reason for limited grid capacity discussed by participants was
resource constraints, especially related to technical, human, and knowledge constraints in the
OPA. For example:
The problem that I find here in Ontario is that when they developed the Green
Energy Act, they didn’t really allocate the resources to go through that change
which we all knew was hard but nobody expected it to be disastrous. There is a lack
of human resources even to process the paperwork; there is a lack of technical
resources out in the field to do the grid.
The participants also found it difficult to understand why resources were limited given that the
issue of grid access is not unique to Canada:
So what they say is that the theoretical disturbances that renewables may create in
the grid are not that big and you can have at least 15 percent of renewables in any
given grid. That is the minimum that they say that you can have. That is a
theoretical thing that some engineers do in the world. If you go to a place like
Germany or Spain that have been operating this kind of situation already for years,
they have raised this bar to 30 percent.
Perhaps most striking about this constraint was the extent to which it hurt the industry.
The seven percent maximum restriction to grid access was quickly reached, and there were no
proposals by the government to increase it. This meant that all companies we examined were
running below capacity, and one company was forced to layoff over 70 employees and
ultimately had to close during our study period. According to an exasperated participant:
It was going to be a 400-megawatt [market] a year. That was the international
predictions from sources, credible sources. That’s what everyone thought; it’s
worth stepping into the market. We wanted 10 percent of the market share… this is
a 50 megawatt facility and today, July 14, there are eight megawatts in operation.
So that’s two per cent of the yearly projection. It’s not like you’re a bit off the
estimate… it’s a complete failure…So there’s no real way for you to overcome
these problems.
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When the seven percent limit was reached, and thus became an institutional constraint,
the nature of the legitimacy of the industry changed as well. Whether renewables should exceed
this limit was questioned, and such questioning demonstrated a lack of cognitive legitimacy for
industry expansion beyond the seven percent limit (Meyer & Scott, 1983; Suchman, 1995).
There was no longer pragmatic legitimacy for the installation of more solar panels tied to the grid
because consumers could not sell excess power back to the grid. However, moral legitimacy did
persist because solar energy could help alleviate continuing societal concerns about the
environment and employment.
Political uncertainty. Our first wave of interviews was conducted in Summer 2011, the
quarter preceding the provincial election. At that time, voters appeared equally split between the
two main parties who had opposing views of the renewable energy industry. In particular, the
incumbent Liberals promised to redouble their renewable energy efforts and to maintain the
GEA, whereas the opposition Conservatives promised to repeal the GEA. Although it was
possible that the program would only change in name and details, our participants viewed this as
a serious threat to the viability of their businesses. One participant stated bluntly: “And of course
then you’ve got the election in the Fall right? That’s going to mess things up.”
Politicians introduced a new level of uncertainty that represented a dramatic institutional
constraint. For example, investors hesitated to invest further, and customers were unwilling to
purchase and install solar panels. A participant noted that: “The opposition making statements
about the industry before the election…that puts everything on hold. If he (Mike Hudak,
Conservative party leader) says in six months, ‘What I want, is to stop all this’, no one’s going to
do anything.” The uncertain future of the GEA was also widely covered in the media, and 10
articles focused on this issue (e.g., Wolfson, 2011b).
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This politicizing of solar energy created confusion because political party platforms
profiled in the media referenced differing data with conflicting results. Seemingly easy questions
to answer, such as the cost to consumers and the province, the number of jobs created, and the
amount of power produced, became enigmas that generated uncertainty:
When people say, what’s the cost to create these green energy jobs? There are 17
different numbers out there. That’s when the government is in a number of these
initiatives and is not fact-based, or not transparent, it’s very hard to actually
validate or debug myths.
Although the Liberal party that was pro-GEA was re-elected in Fall 2011, the second
wave of interviews conducted in Fall 2012 highlighted a continuing political uneasiness. High
profile media coverage of rising electricity rates following the introduction of higher priced
green energy development created pressure for the Liberal government to decrease the FIT rate
for solar and wind energy. Subsequently, the rate for solar rooftop panels that generate less than
10 kWh (kilowatt hour) of energy, such as those on residences, was reduced from 80.2 ¢/kWh to
the current 54.9 ¢/kWh. Consequently, it became less lucrative to invest in these panels based on
profits from selling the energy to the grid (Beneteau, 2011). The media reported:
The local solar industry said reducing the price of solar production won’t kill the
market, but might slow its growth. “There are two components: one is the return on
the investment and other is being able to obtain financing,” local lawyer and solar
investor Paul Mullins said. “Obtaining financing will be difficult.” (Wolfson,
2011c).
Many interviewees reported that political decisions based on short-term political
maneuvering were not in the best interest of business or the long-term interest of the province. A
solar panel manufacturer said:
…this should not be a political debate. The energy model of a country is just as
important as the army or foreign relations or health or education, and you can’t
change those things every four years. You can tweak it, you can modify things in
the plan, but you need to have a long-term commitment to change these things. The
grid is going to last 20-30 years. Generation investment is for 20-30 years. We
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can’t depend on elections every four years. If kids go to school for 12 years, you
can’t change the education every four years. You can’t debate every four years if
you want to have an army or not…there are certain things that shouldn’t be
debated. So that is the biggest hindrance for this industry—is the political debate
before elections.
In the media, a local landowner whose family had farmed the land for generations noted
that political comments about ending the green energy deals were ‘‘very frightening to people in
the county” because farmers were eager to host wind turbines and solar panels (Cross, 2011a).
In spite of the political uncertainty, there was considerable public sentiment that green
energy was important and should be addressed by the politicians. This sentiment included the
business community, as evident from a membership survey by the local Chamber of Commerce:
Not surprisingly a plan for jobs and economic growth were at the top of the list. Also
near the top of the list was energy/power – supply, cost and reliability. This was
interesting because the energy/power issue did not show up in the federal election just a
few months ago or in the municipal election last year (Jones, 2011).
With the appearance of these institutional constraints, industry participants responded
with four ingenious strategies. We now address these in the order in which they appeared.
Ingenuity Strategies
Ingenuity was evident in the interviews with all 22 participants. The ingenuity theme was coded
59 times, 34 of which were about the formation of collaborations and 25 about innovative
products and markets. In the media data, the ingenuity theme was coded 36 times in our 91
articles, with 19 articles discussing collaborations and 17 discussing innovative products and
markets. We identified four types of ingenuity strategies: 1) constraint-challenging multistakeholder collaborations, 2) constraint-escaping new product and market development, 3)
constraint-complying new product partnerships, and 4) constraint-escaping new product
partnerships.
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Constraint-challenging multi-stakeholder collaborations. We identified the formation of
multi-stakeholder collaborations to challenge the institutional constraints as the first ingenuity
strategy. This strategy is consistent with past research that has found stakeholders can drive
change through the formation of collaborations (DiMaggio, 1998; Dorado, 2005; Reay &
Hinings, 2009). We follow Oliver (1991) and use the term challenge, because our sample of
participants consistently challenged the rationality of the two identified institutional constraints.
In both the interviews and media data we found “unequivocal rejection of institutional norms and
expectations;” interviewees’ willingness to share frustrations with the public and us represented a
belief that they had “little to lose by displaying their antagonism toward the constituents that
judge or oppose them” (Oliver, 1991, p. 157). Rejection and antagonism were apparent in the
first few minutes of our interviews (in a number of cases participants were visibly disturbed), and
by the frequent diatribes in the media by people baffled by the two identified institutional
constraints. Media articles in just one week reflected this frustration in their titles, for example:
“Making pollution cheaper for everyone” (Heartfield, 2011); “Those 200 jobs are a pathetic
ransom” (Fuschi, 2011); “Green energy sector frets over vote” (Hall, 2011b); and “No need for
more tax in Ontario” (Sterling, 2011). We suggest that the willingness of stakeholders to
challenge the institutional constraints led them to form collaborations that were viewed as a
legitimate way to challenge constraints. As expressed by one participant:
“…if you work together, we’re all in the same boat, we’re here together. If the political
environment changes, it changes for everybody. Like if we try to stand up and say
something to the government, [it’s better] if we have a united voice than if we do it
individually.”
Through collaborations, diverse and sometimes competing stakeholders ingeniously
combined their resources to resist and influence the institutional constraints, mobilizing their
resources in an attempt to drive institutional change (Dorado, 2005). For instance, an ad hoc
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collaboration of stakeholders planned to spend $10,000 on advertising to educate the public
about solar options and their economic impact (Wolfson, 2012b). Individually, few stakeholders
had sufficient resources for such informational advertising, such as the self-employed installer of
solar panels whom we interviewed. Another example included scientists and green energy
officials gathered at the local university to discuss system connection constraints and how to
lobby for change (Wolfson, 2011a). Lastly, a compelling example of a multi-stakeholder
collaboration described by Battagello (2011a) in The Windsor Star was an unexpected alliance of
interests between business and environmentalists.
Greenpeace Canada and a local solar panel company unveiled a mock memorial cemetery
Wednesday to signify the death of green energy jobs across Ontario if Conservative
Leader Tim Hudak is elected premier Oct. 6.
Building on the global growth of associations and trade fairs like Intersolar, emerging
Ontario associations extended membership to an expanded renewables ecosystem including
investors, economic development agencies, and labor unions. The inclusion of such third-party
stakeholders contributed to building the industry’s legitimacy (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994). For
example, these associations were able to commission independent studies to provide unbiased
information to the public and government on the Ontario solar industry. One CEO expressed a
need for an even greater and more powerful association that could be instrumental in forming a
national energy policy that overcame political barriers and constraints: “What we very much
need is a national energy policy…We need something that can bridge these four year election
cycles that make it such a political issue.”
Particularly ingenious about the collaborations were their dissemination strategies. For
example, when using the media to convey information to the general public, the collaborations
would frequently discuss the issue of job creation, which was highly salient given the province’s

23	
  

reliance on the struggling manufacturing sector. Investment in renewable forms of energy and
solar in particular were promoted as a way to create jobs. Our participants described how
collaborations allowed them to express their frustration at how the limited access to the power
grid stifled job creation and created layoffs. The Windsor Star, sensitive to job creation and the
stimulation of the economy, often clearly sided with solar companies and their ability to create
jobs. For example, this editorial voiced strong opinions against the government that was
portrayed as the cause of the layoffs and reduced work:
The high cost of energy is related to old delivery systems and a failure to maintain
infrastructure. It’s the bitter pill Ontarians have had to swallow because of a series of bad
moves that occurred under both the Tories and the Liberals (Beneteau, 2011).
The Windsor Star also frequently interviewed frustrated front-line employees who openly
expressed their anger at the situation (e.g., Wolfson, 2011e). Local greenhouse growers also
joined the renewables chorus. Constrained by inadequate power grid capacity, they lobbied
heavily for a new power line that would allow them to move forward with 500 more acres under
glass (Cross, 2011b).
As has been found in research examining institutional entrepreneurship (Creed et al.
2002; Lounsbury et al. 2003; Rao 1998), stakeholders legitimized their grievances against the
institutional constraints by framing them within popular social discourses, thus furthering their
moral legitimacy.
In sum, collaborations effectively used the media to garner public support and challenge
the institutional constraints. Collaborations required a relatively small commitment of
organizational resources, as firms tried to alter the constraints while operating as usual. Uniting
with multiple stakeholders imaginatively brought together resources to enter a new domain of
action: political activity to alter constraints (Lampel et al., 2011). Ultimately, however, this
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strategy was unsuccessful at changing the institutional constraints. This is graphically portrayed
in Figure 1 by the thick arrow that is rebuffed by the institutional constraints.
Constraint-escaping new product and market development. With the failure of the first
ingenuity strategy, a second strategy quickly emerged, constraint-escaping new product and
market development. It was here that we witnessed internal transitions within individual firms.
They recognized both the severity of the constraints and their inability to alter them. In response,
they began to create ingenious solutions to adapt to the constraints and enter new domains of
action. We follow Oliver (1991) and use the term escape to refer to firms changing activities and
domains (Thompson, 1967). Entrepreneurs recognized the difficulty in changing constraints and
so developed customized products and niche markets that represented the internal organizational
change needed to survive the institutional environment.
This strategy emerged in 2010, but it accelerated between the summer of 2011 and the
summer of 2012. A number of companies developed a variety of products that functioned
independent of grid access. For example, an entrepreneur proudly announced that his company
had developed a solar kiosk/bar that provided refrigeration and did not require access to the
power grid. Solar-powered golf carts were sold to a local golf course, creating 10 full-time jobs
and the installation of a 125-kilowatt rooftop project (Wolfson, 2012a). Other interesting
examples were a solar cooker (Wolfson, 2012b) and a solar recharging station and bench for
smartphones and laptops (Schmidt, 2012).
The constrained local market also prompted local entrepreneurs to consider export
opportunities and new markets. For example, a solar-powered pump targeting the African market
was developed (Wolfson, 2012a). In addition, two media articles (Battagello, 2011b; Hall,
2011d) and two CEOs (one in the first round of interviews and one in the second round)
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discussed newly developed products by local manufacturers that specifically targeted the
adjacent United States market for sales while avoiding the constraints imposed in the Ontario
market. One CEO of a local solar panel manufacturer summarized his strategy:
…because no one can get connected, there’s no demand domestically in the province.
Now you have your export, that’s where the future truly is. That’s where we’re looking at
right now; we’re marketing down in the States a lot.
While the second ingenuity strategy was being developed and implemented, stakeholders
continued to use the first ingenuity strategy and challenged the institutional constraints, albeit
unsuccessfully. Without the second ingenuity strategy, organizations were not likely to survive,
as evidenced by an international company that was forced to shut down. Their seven million
dollar plant was closed in Spring 2012, and nearly 100 employees lost their jobs. This plant was
the only one to fail in our study, and the company was quick to blame limited access to the grid
as the reason for their closure. In contrast, the government (both the provincial finance minister
and the city’s mayor were interviewed in the article) blamed the company for its lack of
competitiveness (Schmidt & Hall, 2012).
Indeed, the remaining Ontario-based companies exercised ingenuity that enabled them to
circumvent the constraints. We depict this ingenious adaptation with a thick arrow in Figure 1
that goes around the top down constraints. In terms of Lampel et al. (2011), this appears to be
what they called bypassing constraints, a topic that received limited attention in the call for
papers compared to changing the institutional constraints or adapting to the constraints.
Constraint-complying new product partnerships. We subsequently observed a third
ingenuity strategy, which was the development of new product partnerships that found niches
within the Ontario power grid. We use Oliver’s (1991, p. 153) term complying in this ingenuity
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strategy because the partners acquiesced to the institutional constraints while “consciously and
strategically” complying in anticipation of “self-serving benefits”.
There were a few examples of this strategy. One was a partnership between a solar
energy start-up company and the University of Windsor who together worked to develop a new
system that automatically shut off power from traditional energy sources when solar power was
being produced (Macaluso, 2012). It was estimated that the new system could reduce electricity
bills by as much as 70 per cent. Another constraint-complying strategy emerged when a solar
startup CEO and a solar aggregator agreed to partner to overcome limited grid access by paying
for their own upgrades to the power lines to a decentralized energy system. The upgraded power
lines represented a form of new product development. Notably, no organization could implement
this ingenious solution on its own; instead, our participants were willing to pool limited
organizational resources and jointly incur short-term costs for long-term gain (Wolfson, 2011d).
This third ingenuity strategy was innovative because it used constraint-complying new
product development in partnerships, a type of organization that was new to the participants
(Rogers, 1983; Schumpeter, 1986). This is depicted by thick arrows in Figure 1 with the strategy
incorporating both bottom-up ingenuity and top-down constraints. Moreover, this opportunitybased approach combined the original compliance strategy with the collaborative strategy they
displayed as the seven percent cap began to threaten their survival. The thinner arrows in Figure
1 represent this synthesis of previous strategies. Stakeholders learned that collaborations could
be effective when combined with compliance instead of challenge.
Constraint-escaping new product partnerships. The final ingenuity strategy we observed
again involved elements of previous strategies; here, partnerships developed new products that
enabled firms to escape the constraints (Oliver, 1991). For example, a solar panel manufacturer
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joined with a company that made ground-mounted solar systems that would reduce labor costs
by as much as 90 percent and increase efficiency to the point where “our first system was
shipped, installed and commissioned all on the same day” (Hall, 2012). This partnership reduced
the political uncertainty by driving down costs making the use of solar panels more economically
legitimate. A second example of this strategy was a partnership between a local solar
manufacturer and a collaboration of researchers at the University of Windsor who together
developed a grid-independent solar carport (Wright, 2011).
From the second ingenuity strategy that appeared in 2010, stakeholders had learned an
effective means to get around the institutional constraints, namely, by developing new, gridindependent products and extending into markets outside of Ontario. Moreover, since we found
evidence of collaborations as early as 2009, it makes sense that by 2012 the greater
connectedness among stakeholders would bear new fruit. Accordingly, by 2012 the final
ingenuity strategy became apparent, and it combined the effective escape tactic from the second
ingenuity strategy with developing partnerships that first began to form in the first ingenuity
strategy. Once again, the thinner arrows in Figure 1 represent this synthesis of previous
strategies. And as shown by the thick arrow in Figure 1, this strategy was effective at
circumventing the institutional constraints.
Ingenuity and legitimacy. Although our first identified ingenuity strategy was not
successful at complying with or escaping the constraints, our second, third and fourth ingenuity
strategies were. Part of their success was that stakeholders were able to extend their existing
stock of legitimacy to the new products and markets resulting from the strategies (Ashforth &
Gibbs, 1990). The ability of solar panels to provide electric power to customers who were not
connected to the Ontario power grid demonstrated pragmatic legitimacy. Stakeholders also built
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on a base of regulative and moral legitimacy established by the politicians and the public by
developing products that did not contravene the regulations, by continuing to position these
products as ‘green,’ and by continuing to provide jobs in an area hard hit by the decline in the
automobile industry. Moreover, these new products did not require government subsidies, an
issue that before had raised considerable questions from politicians and in the media (Sterling,
2011). No media articles questioned the new products or markets, suggesting cognitive
legitimacy (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008; Meyer & Scott, 1983). Lastly, we found that when an
individual firm extended legitimacy to its new products or markets, the legitimacy of the entire
industry benefited. That is, through firm-level and partnership-level ingenuity strategies, the
industry garnered legitimacy by demonstrating independence of government subsidies and the
grid, thus demonstrating a free-market approach.

Contributions and Implications
Research. Scholarly work on new constructs usually includes the important work of
enhancing the clarity of definitions and measures (Kaplan, 1964; Suddaby, 2010a). Our first
contribution to research is enhancing the conceptual clarity of the construct of ingenuity. We
found that ingenuity strategies could be usefully framed using Oliver’s (1991) responses to
institutional processes, in our case, compliance, challenge, and escape. Two implications for
future research are seeing if these three responses appear in other settings and if other responses
elaborated by Oliver (1991) are useful for classifying ingenuity.
Past research on institutions and institutional entrepreneurship recommends greater
attention to bottom-up processes of institutional creation (Scott, 1994; Suddaby, 2010b) and to
dynamic models of how institutions form, change, and decline (Barley & Tolbert, 1997;
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Greenwood et al., 2002; Perkmann & Spicer, 2007). Our second contribution is inducing a
process model of bottom-up ingenuity in response to top-down institutional pressures. We found
that ingenuity developed over time in a sequence of strategic responses characterized by
challenge, escape, compliance, and escape. Future research might investigate how organizational
ingenuity unfolds over time in other industries, the different strategies employed, and the
sequence in which they are manifested.
Legitimacy is necessary for surviving in strong institutional environments (Greenwood et
al., 2002; Meyer & Rowan, 1977), such as those where ingenuity is needed. Our third
contribution is showing how industry participants capitalized on existing stocks of legitimacy in
developing their ingenuity strategies, specifically how pragmatic, regulative, moral, and
cognitive legitimacy applied to them. Our research using different dimensions of legitimacy
further develops the claim that changes can be legitimized by framing them within popular
discourses (Creed et al., 2002; Deephouse, 1996; Lounsbury et al., 2003; Perkmann & Spicer
2007; Rao 1998). The relationship between different types of ingenuity and different dimensions
of legitimacy over time should be examined further in other contexts.
A central question for research on ingenuity is: “Under what conditions does
organizational ingenuity emerge?” (Lampel et al., 2011, p. 459). Our fourth contribution is
identifying one condition when ingenuity emerged, specifically, when an institutional enabler
became an institutional constraint. This occurred even though the institution itself, the GEA, did
not change. Instead, successful entrepreneurial innovation quickly filled the capacity of the
renewable energy market in Ontario. At this point, innovation took place within institutional
constraints, consistent with the definition of ingenuity (Lampel et al., 2011).

30	
  

Past research has shown that collaborations are important in driving institutional change
(Dorado, 2005; Greenwood et al., 2002; Perkmann & Spicer, 2007; Reay & Hinings, 2009), and
we found collaborations in the Ontario solar energy industry. What makes this a contribution is
the speed at which they appeared; collaborations began to form within the first year of the
introduction of the GEA. The rapid appearance of collaborations was unexpected, based on past
theorizing about legitimacy in embryonic industries by Aldrich and Fiol (1994, p. 655):
“Collective action is extremely difficult to organize early in the life of an industry due to free
rider problems.” We propose that collaborations in embryonic industries happen faster when
institutional constraints are stronger; future research could test this proposition.
Policy. The implications of this study for the Ontario solar industry are dramatic. Without
changes to the current institutional constraints the industry is unlikely to grow beyond its current
form and a promising opportunity for clean energy, investment, and job creation will be lost.
Firms are looking outside of Ontario to expand and to stay in business, and the firm of one of our
interview participants was forced to close. Further, Ontario will not reduce dependence on fossil
fuels, an important topic for policy makers and researchers alike (CBC News, 2011; Okereke,
Wittneben, & Bowen, 2012; Wittneben, Okereke, Banerjee, & Levy, 2009).
Currently, according to recent REN 21 Renewables Global Status Reports, North
American solar companies lag behind global solar competitors (Sawin 2011; 2012). Our
interviewees consistently demonstrated a strong grasp of the global solar industry, market and
stakeholders. All participants acknowledged that they sought out innovation overseas, primarily
in Europe. This echoes a recent report by IHS Emerging Energy Research (2011) that notes
“Europe has become the testing ground for the latest generation of solar technologies including
thermal storage, CPV [concentrated photovoltaics], and innovative PV [photovoltaics]
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technologies.” This should be of particular concern to the Canadian government as the GEA was
created to spur innovation within the province and potentially be the first of many Acts for the
rest of Canada. With the seven percent grid restriction, our participants indicated that many
people (such as investors, customers, engineers) were unwilling to invest resources in Canada.
Our study highlights a need for all relevant stakeholders, including private, public and
non-profit entities, to be at the policy table if sustainable climate change policies are to be
successfully introduced (Okereke et al., 2012). This is consistent with past research that has
found that such multi-stakeholder partnerships are essential to address existing regulatory,
participation, resource and learning gaps (Pinkse & Kolk, 2012; Wijen & Ansari, 2007).
Managers. In the Ontario solar industry, the seven percent restriction changed from
enabling to constraining within less than one year. Managers should be aware of how quickly
such a change can occur so they might preemptively strike at the institutional constraints.
It is not surprising that the first ingenuity strategy (constraint-challenging multistakeholder collaborations) represented a relatively small transition within the organizations we
studied. Essentially, stakeholders sought to change the constraints with minimal investment and
by continuing business as usual (making solar panels for the Ontario market that required grid
access). It makes sense for organizational stakeholders to first seek to change constraints with a
minimal commitment of resources. What is important for managers is that within one year, the
firms that survived in our sample realized that this strategy was not effective and rapidly
changed. At this point they were forced to commit significant resources to develop new products
that could sell independent of grid access. Thus managers must quickly surmise the severity of
the constraints and their ability to alter them and exercise the appropriate ingenuity strategy. Our
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study delineated one way for organizations to change and step around severe institutional
constraints by developing new products and markets, sometimes in partnership with others.

Limitations
The qualitative nature of our study limits its literal generalization beyond the context of the solar
industry in Ontario. However, it provides insight about an embryonic industry that could be a
benchmark to others, namely in examining the role of ingenuity, institutional constraints and
legitimacy in embedded agency and in the process of institutional change. Future researchers
might examine other industries to see how the process differs, including additional ingenuity
strategies that emerge under different institutional constraints.
Furthermore, the industry is highly concentrated in the southern part of Ontario, and
correspondingly this was our main area of investigation. Most of our interviewees lived there,
and our media data were obtained from a single source. Future research could investigate if
similar findings emerge in other places where solar energy is being developed and where
ingenuity in the face of institutional constraints is exercised.
Lastly, we defined organizational ingenuity as an ability, yet we were only able to
observe its outcomes. Similar concerns have existed for other constructs, like dynamic
capabilities and agility. As this new construct of organizational ingenuity is further developed,
future research will need to tease out its nature as trait, skill, action, or outcome.

Conclusion
We used a case study of the Ontario solar energy industry to build theory on the emerging
construct of organizational ingenuity (Eisenhardt, 1989; Lampel et al., 2011). Because ingenuity
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takes place within institutional constraints (Lampel et al., 2011), we used institutional theory to
orient our research (Suddaby, 2006). Our research question asked about the role of
organizational ingenuity in the paradox of embedded agency (Seo & Creed, 2002). We induced a
process model of ingenuity that incorporated top-down pressure at the industry level manifested
by institutional constraints and bottom-up change at the firm level (Barley & Tolbert, 1997;
Greenwood et al., 2002; Perkmann & Spicer, 2007; Scott, 1994; Suddaby, 2010b). We found that
severe top-down constraints lead to a set of bottom-up ingenuity strategies that challenged,
complied with, or escaped the constraints. These ingenuity strategies were manifested at multiple
levels of analysis, and firms were able to extend different dimensions of legitimacy to the
strategies. Hence, when confronted by significant institutional constraints, we conclude that
firms can circumvent these constraints ingeniously and legitimately.
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TABLE 1: Interview Participants
Organization

Position

Economic Development Corporation
Environmental Committee for National Union
Financial Aggregator and Renewable Energy Development
Company
Institutional Renewable Energy Investor
Local Community College
Local Government Workforce Agency
Local Government Workforce Agency
Local Government Workforce Agency
Local Government Workforce Agency
Personnel Recruitment Firm
Provincial Government Funding Agency: Green Technology
and Innovation
Provincial Ministry of Economic Development and Trade	
  
Provincial Ministry of Energy
Provincial Solar Association
Renewable Energy Technology Consulting Company
Solar Aggregator
Solar PV Solutions
Solar Panel Manufacturer
Solar Panel Manufacturer
Solar Systems, Engineering and Design
Solar Technology Installer
Switchgear Manufacturer

VP Community Development
President
CEO

	
  

2011

2012
X
X
X

CEO
Renewable Energy Program Coordinator
Director of Development
Executive Director
Program Designer
Research and Trend Analyst
Account Manager for the Energy Sector
Business Development Manager

X
X

Senior Advisor
Senior Manager, Smart Grid and Network Policy
President and CEO
Director of Project Development and Management
Managing Director and Founder
VP Sales
General Manager for Canadian Operation
Founder and CEO
CEO and Founder
CEO and Founder
Founder and CEO

X

X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X

X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
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FIGURE 1: Organizational Ingenuity in the Ontario Solar Energy Industry, 2009-12
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